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AVOIDING PAYNE: AN ANALYSIS OF VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE
RANDALL COYNE*
On the final day of its 1991 Term, the United States Supreme
Court issued its decision in Payne v. Tennessee,1 arming prosecutors
seeking the death penalty with a new weapon-victim impact evi-
dence.2 The immediate damage that Payne inflicted on capital de-
fendants was easily understood. States could now permit the ad-
mission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on
that subject during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.' How-
ever, the true horror of Payne may lie in the threat to all constitu-
tional liberties posed by the majority's willingness to abandon stare
decisis and overrule two of the Court's recent decisions, Booth v.
Maryland " and South Carolina v. Gathers.5
This article first explores the history of the battle over the ad-
missibility of victim impact evidence by examining the Booth and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. B. Mus. Ed., University of Massa-
chusetts, Amherst; J.D., Georgetown University. Along with Lyn Entzeroth, Professor
Coyne is the co-author of the casebook, The Eighth Amendment, Capital Punishment and the
Judicial Process (Carolina Academic Press, 1994). He recently authored the article, Inflicting
Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence During the Sentencing Phase of Capital
Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
Id. at 2609. The Supreme Court held that in cases where capital punishment is sought
"[a] state may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of
the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the
death penalty should be imposed." Id. The Court concluded that such evidence should not
be treated "differently than other relevant evidence is treated." Id.
SId.
482 U.S. 496 (1987). In Booth, the Supreme Court held that evidence describing the
personal characteristics of the victims, the impact of the crimes on the victims' families,
and family members' opinions and views of the crimes and the defendant were "irrelevant
to the capital sentencing decision, and . . . create[d] a constitutionally unacceptable risk
that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at
502-03. The Payne decision overruled the first two parts of the Booth holding, but did not
decide whether family members' views on the crime and the defendant were considered
relevant evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Payne, 1 I1 S. Ct. at 2609.
490 U.S. 805 (1989). In Gathers, the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial comment
concerning the personal characteristics of the victim was inadmissible at a capital sentenc-
ing trial. Id. at 811.
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Gathers decisions. Second, this article dissects the Payne decision to
determine whether the Court has left open any avenues of argu-
ment that, although not prohibited per se by the Eighth Amend-
ment, victim impact evidence should, nonetheless, be prohibited
in certain circumstances. Third, this article offers practical sugges-
tions on how defense lawyers may seek to minimize the damage
wrought by victim impact statements and perhaps even employ
the rationale of Payne to benefit their clients. Fourth, this article
examines recent legislative efforts in Oklahoma designed to im-
pose the Payne ruling on criminal defendants generally, and on
capital defendants in particular. To that end, the article summa-
rizes the key provisions of the victims' impact law which took ef-
fect in Oklahoma on July 1, 1992.8 Lastly, this article criticizes the
creation in Oklahoma of a new aggravating circumstance in capi-
tal murder prosecutions inspired by Payne. Oklahoma House Bill
227 1,' signed into law by Governor Walters on April 14, 1992,
furnishes tragic proof that in Oklahoma all victims are not created
equal.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE
A. Setting Precedent: Booth v. Maryland
In Booth v. Maryland, John Booth was found "guilty of two
counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery, and conspir-
acy to commit robbery."8 Booth and an accomplice had entered
the home of an elderly couple and had robbed, gagged, and
stabbed them to death with a kitchen knife.9 Prior to sentencing,
Act of Apr. 30, 1992, ch. 136, 1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 442 (West) (amending OKLA.
STAT. tit. 19, §§ 215.33 & 215.39 (1992), OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 142.3 (1991), OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 991a (1985), OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 332.2 & 332.8 (1991), and adding OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, §§ 984, 984.1 & 984.2 (1992)).
H.B. 2271, 43d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1991 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 177 (West) (codified as
amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.10 (1992) [hereinafter HOUSE BILL]). H.B. 2271 is
titled "An Act Relating to Crimes and Punishments; Amending 21 O.S. 1991, Section
701.10, Which Relates to the Death Penalty; Authorizing the Introduction of Certain Evi-
dence During the Sentencing Proceeding; and Declaring an Emergency." Id. This newly
enacted measure effectively expands the list of aggravating circumstances in capital murder
cases to include harm and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family. Id.
' Booth, 482 U.S. at 498.
* Id. at 497-98. Booth was a neighbor of the victims and knew that they could easily
identify him. Id. The victims' bodies were discovered by their son two days after the rob-
bery. Id.
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the State of Maryland's Division of Parole and Probation prepared
"a presentence report that described Booth's background, educa-
tion and employment history, and criminal record."10 As was re-
quired by Maryland statute, the report also contained a victim im-
pact statement ("VIS") which described the effect of the crime on
the victim and the victim's family. 1 In the Booth case, the VIS was
based on interviews with the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law,
and granddaughter."2
Much of the VIS emphasized the victims' outstanding personal
qualities and stressed how deeply the victims would be missed.'
For example, the victims' son reported that his father was a life-
long hard worker, his mother was "young at heart," and both par-
ents had many devout friends."' In addition, the VIS described
the emotional and personal problems the family members encoun-
tered as a result of the crimes.15 The victims' son reported that he
suffered from depression and lack of sleep.' Similarly, the vic-
tims' daughter reported that she also suffered from a lack of sleep
and had become withdrawn and distrustful.' The victims' grand-
daughter reported that the deaths had ruined her sister's wedding
which had taken place a few days after the crimes.' 8 Furthermore,
she had received counseling for several months, only to quit when
she concluded that "no one could help her."' 9
Finally, the VIS set forth the family members' opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and of Booth.2 In this regard, the
son stated that his parents had been "butchered like animals."'2
The daughter concluded that she could never forgive the mur-
10 Id.
" Id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(2) (1990) (requiring that VIS be in-
cluded with presentence investigation report in felony cases and misdemeanor cases which
cause serious injury).
12 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 499 (1987). The complete VIS is reprinted in an
appendix to the Court's opinion. Id. at 509-15.
', Id.
Id. at n.3.
I6 d. at 499.
10 Id. at 499-500.
"= Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 500 (1987). The daughter also mentioned that she
could no longer watch violent movies and that the sight of kitchen knives reminded her of
the murders. Id.
1s Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
1992]
68 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
derer and that such a person "could never. be rehabilitated. 22
Moreover, the state official who conducted the family interviews
concluded the VIS by expressing doubt that the family "will ever
be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by
the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved ones were
murdered and taken from them."23
Booth's trial attorney moved to suppress the VIS on the ground
that it was both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory and therefore
its use in a capital murder case violated the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 24 The trial court denied the mo-
tion, and the prosecutor agreed to simply read the VIS to the
jury, rather than call individual family members to testify. 25 After
considering the report and the victim impact evidence contained
therein, the jury sentenced Booth to death on one count of mur-
der and to life imprisonment on the second count. 6
On appeal, five members of the United States Supreme Court
concluded that the introduction of a VIS at the sentencing phase
of a capital murder trial violated the Eighth Amendment and va-
cated Booth's death sentence. 7 Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell emphasized that "a jury must make an 'individualized de-
termination' whether the defendant in question should be exe-
cuted, based on 'the character of the individual and the circum-
stances of the crime.' ",28 According to the Court, the information
contained in a VIS could be irrelevant to a capital sentencing deci-
sion if it is shown to have no bearing on the defendant's "personal
responsibility and moral guilt."'29 Indeed, a VIS focuses on the
character and reputation of the victim and the effect of the crime
on his family."0 Thus, VIS information may "divert the jury's at-
22 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 500 (1987).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 500-01; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment mandates that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id.
28 Booth, 482 U.S. at 501.
26 Id.
2:7 Id. at 509.
28 Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
2I ld. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)); see Enmund, 458 U.S. at
801. In construing the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court stated that "[flor purposes
of imposing the death penalty, [a defendant's] criminal culpability must be limited to his
participation in the [crime], and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsi-
bility and moral guilt." d.
"0 Booth, 482 U.S. at 504. Focusing on the victim and the effect of the crime on the
[Vol. 8:65
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tention away from the defendant's background and record, and
the circumstances of the crime." 1 As a result, a sentencing deci-
sion based in part on VIS information may turn on irrelevant fac-
tors such as the degree to which the victim's family is willing and
able to articulate its grief, or the relative worth of the victim's
character. 2 Similarly, family members' opinions and characteriza-
tions of the crimes "serve no other purpose than to inflame the
jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence
concerning the crime and the defendant." 3
B. Following Precedent: South Carolina v. Gathers
Two years after Booth was decided, the Court reaffirmed its
principles in South Carolina v. Gathers." During closing arguments
at the sentencing phase of Demetrius Gathers's capital murder
trial, the prosecutor read to the jury at length from a religious
tract that the victim had been carrying and commented on per-
sonal qualities he inferred from the victim's possession of the reli-
gious tract and a voter registration card.3 5 The jury sentenced
Gathers to death.36 Because the prosecutor's remarks "conveyed
the suggestion [that Gathers] deserved a death sentence because
the victim was a religious man and a registered voter," the South
Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Booth, reversed Gathers's
death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.37
In another 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed. 8 Although the state had not introduced a VIS, the major-
victim's family may be completely unrelated to the blameworthiness of a defendant. Id.
Rarely is a defendant motivated to commit a murder based on the effect it will have on the
victim or the victim's family. Id.
3' Id. at 505. In addition, the introduction of evidence of a victim's good character
would entitle the defendant to rebut this evidence in a "mini-trial" on the victim's charac-
ter. Id. at 507.
" Id. at 505-06. Furthermore, in some cases a victim may not leave behind a family. Id.
" Id. at 508.
- 490 U.S. 805 (1989). The victim in Gathers was an unemployed, mentally unstable
thirty-one year old man who considered himself a preacher and carried bags containing
various religious items. Id. at 807. The defendant and three friends brutally assaulted the
victim one night in a park when the victim refused to speak with them. Id. at 806-07.
Gathers, in particular, beat the victim with an umbrella, inserted it in his anus, and later
returned and stabbed him to death. Id. at 807. Gathers was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death. Id. at 806.
Id. at 808-810.
' Id. at 806.
Id. at 810 (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 484 (1988)).
'Id.
1992]
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ity found that the prosecutor's comments regarding the victim's
personal characteristics could result in a death sentence "because
of factors about which [Gathers] was unaware and that were irrel-
evant to the decision to kill." 9 Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan stressed that although the scattering of the victim's per-
sonal papers was a relevant circumstance directly related to the
crime, "the content of the various papers the victim happened to
be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortuitous and can-
not provide any information relevant to [Gathers's] moral
culpability."4
Notwithstanding two 5-4 decisions squarely holding that victim
impact evidence violated the Eighth Amendment, changes in the
Court personnel underscored the precarious position of Booth and
Gathers as enduring precedent. Significantly, the author of the ma-
jority opinion in Booth, Justice Powell, resigned at the end of the
1987 term and was replaced by Justice Kennedy, who became one
of the four dissenters in Gathers." Replacing Justice Powell, a
moderate, with Justice Kennedy, a conservative, should have
tipped the 5-4 balance decisively in favor of the Booth dissenters.
However, Justice White, himself a Booth dissenter, mysteriously
joined the majority in Gathers, and grumbled in a separate concur-
rence: "Unless Booth v. Maryland . . . is to be overruled, the judg-
ment below must be affirmed.""' Justice Scalia, writing a separate
dissent, picked up on White's invitation and called for Booth to be
overruled. 3 Similarly, Justice O'Connor's dissent revealed that
she, Chief Justice Rehnquist-, and Justice Kennedy stood "ready to
overrule" Booth."
Although Justice White's unexpected vote in Gathers preserved
Booth, it merely delayed the inevitable. Within two years, Justice
Brennan, a liberal, retired; Justice Souter, a conservative, replaced
him; and Justice White retreated from his apparent reverence for
stare decisis.
" Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)).
40 Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
41 Id. (justice Kennedy joining in Justice O'Connor's dissent).
42 Id. (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 823-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'4 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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C. Overruling Precedent: Payne v. Tennessee
Justice White's invitation to overrule Booth was finally accepted
by the Court in Payne v. Tennessee.45 Significantly, neither Payne,
who had sought review, nor the State of Tennessee in its response
to Payne's certiorari petition, requested that Booth or Gathers be
reconsidered."' Undeterred, six members of the Court sua sponte
rewrote the application for certiorari and directed the parties to
brief and argue whether the decisions should be overruled.'7
Moreover, so that the case could be heard in April during the
final -session of the Term, the Justices ordered the briefing
expedited.' 8
The facts of Payne are especially grisly. Payne, who had been
injecting cocaine and drinking beer much of the day, entered an
apartment occupied by twenty-eight year old Charisse Christo-
pher, her two year old daughter Lacie, and her three year old son
Nicholas. 9 When Charisse resisted his sexual advances, Payne vi-
ciously stabbed Charisse and Lacie to death.5 0 Nicholas, who had
been stabbed several times by a butcher's knife which completely
penetrated his body from front to back, miraculously survived.51
During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor introduced a
videotape of the crime scene which captured the carnage in color
footage.52 Additionally, the prosecutor called Charisse's mother
Mary Zvolanek, to testify to her grandson Nicholas's reaction to
the murders of his mother and sister.53 According to Mrs.
Zvolanek:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why
she doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He
comes to me many times during the week and asks me,
41 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
46 111 S. Ct. 1031, 1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent to the grant of certiorari,
Justice Stevens stated that "the Court's decision to expedite the consideration of this case
and to ask the parties to address whether we should overrule Booth v. Maryland and South
Carolina v. Gathers, a question presented neither in the petition for certiorari nor in the
response, is both unwise and unnecessary." Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (granting writ of certiorari).
Id. (requiring petitioner's brief to be served and filed in four weeks). But see id. (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (noting that expediting of case was "unwise and unnecessary").
41 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2601.
50 Id. at 2601-02.
5' Id. at 2602.
" State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990), affid, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
" Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2603.
1992]
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Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He
says, I'm worried about my Lacie."
Arguing for the death penalty during closing agument, the
prosecutor commented on the continuing effects of Nicholas's
experience:
But we do know that Nicholas was alive. And Nicholas was in
the same room. Nicholas was still conscious. His eyes were
open. He responded to the paramedics. He was able to follow
their directions. He was able to hold his intestines in as he
was carried to the ambulance. So he knew what happened to
his mother and baby sister.55
Finally, the prosecutor strongly implied that returning a verdict
of death somehow would help Nicholas by stating: "[T]here is
something you can do for Nicholas .... He is going to want to
know what type of justice was done. He is going to want to know
what happened. With your verdict you will provide the answer.""
Thus, even though Nicholas was too young to testify and presum-
ably had not been asked whether he wanted Payne to be executed,
the prosecutor imputed this desire to him.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist repudiated
the Court's earlier decisions which had barred jury consideration
of victim impact statements in capital cases.5" Per Rehnquist, Booth
and Gathers were "decided by the narrowest of margins, over spir-
ited dissents challenging the basic underpinning of those deci-
sions," and "were wrongly decided and should be, and now are,
overruled."5 ' Rehnquist rejected the premise of Booth and Gathers
which stated that evidence relating to the victim's character or the
peculiar circumstances or sufferings of the victim's family does not
reflect on the defendant's blameworthiness or moral culpability.59
To the contrary, the "specific harm" caused by a defendant is an
important factor in determining appropriate punishment. 60
Therefore, "if a state chooses to permit the admission of victim-
54 Id.
I d.
5Id.
11 Id. at 2609-11.
" Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
" Id. at 2605.
o Id. at 2608.
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impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."61
Systematically, the majority opinion attacked the arguments ad-
vanced in support of Booth by Justice Powell just four years ear-
lier.62 For example, the anti-Booth majority found that the require-
ment that a capital defendant be treated as a "uniquely individual
human being" did not mandate that the defendant receive that
consideration wholly apart from the crime which he committed. 8
Similarly, the fact that it might not be tactically prudent for a cap-
ital defendant to rebut victim impact evidence did not necessarily
render such evidence inadmissible. 4 Moreover, the majority
found that victim impact evidence was not generally offered to en-
courage juries to discriminate among victims on the basis of their
worth to society." Rather, it is offered to show each victim's uni-
queness as an individual human being, regardless of how the jury
views the loss to society resulting from the victim's death.6 Be-
cause the sentencer must consider "any relevant mitigating evi-
dence that the defendant proffers in support of a sentence less
than death, 67 the State should not be barred from either offering
"a glimpse of the life" which a defendant "chose to extinguish" 68
or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and to society
which resulted from the defendant's actions.69
II. AvoIDING PAYNE
A. Federal Constitutional Challenges
Careful analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions on the admis-
sibility of victim impact evidence reveals three different types of
information which prosecutors seek to place before the jury as vic-
tim impact evidence. Broadly speaking, information is proferred
regarding: (1) the personal qualities and characteristics of the vic-
tim; (2) the severe emotional and financial impact of the crimes on
*t Id. at 2609.
IS d. at 2606-09.
u Payne, 11I S. Ct. at 2606-07.
Id. at 2607.
Id. at 2607-08.
SId.
87 Id. at 2606 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)).
Payne, I I I S. Ct. at 2607 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting)).
69 Id.
1992]
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the victim's family; and (3) family members' opinions which char-
acterize both the defendant and the defendant's crime. Although
all three types would be constitutionally inadmissible under Booth
and Gathers, Payne only revived the first two."0 Payne did not ad-
dress the holdings in Booth and Gathers which forbade family
members both from offering characterizations of the crime and
the defendant and from offering recommendations as to the
proper punishment .7 Thus, defense attorneys should strenuously
argue that this type of 'evidence remains unconstitutional, even
under the current Court's chameleonlike jurisprudence.
Even the first two types of evidence-qualities of the victim and
suffering of the victim's family-remain vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge. If victim impact evidence introduced at the sen-
tencing phase is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fun-
damentally unfair, then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment may provide relief.72
B. State Law Challenges
At one time, a criminal defendant whose constitutional rights
had been violated could confidently seek relief in the United
States Supreme Court, regardless of the nature of the criminal
charges against him. Similarly, at one time, a villager suffering a
toothache might profitably repair to the local blacksmith to have
the offending tooth removed. Today, both would be well advised
to look elsewhere for relief.
Payne simply holds that the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution erects no per se barrier to the admission of cer-
tain types of victim impact evidence. States remain free, at least
as of this writing, to provide more protection for the rights of the
accused as a matter of state law than the Supreme Court is willing
to mandate as a matter of federal constitutional law. Conse-
quently, state courts should be urged by defense lawyers to hold
that, notwithstanding Payne, the state's constitution, statutes, and
7 Id. at 2609 (holding that evidence relating to victim's personal characteristics as well
as emotional impact on victim's family was not prohibited by Eighth Amendment).
"' Id. at 2611 n.2.
72 Id. at 2608 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)).
73 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. The Court held that "if the state chooses to permit the
admission of the victim impact evidence ... the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar-
rier." Id.
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case law mandate the exclusion of victim impact evidence.
For example, Oklahoma case law has long prohibited prosecu-
tors from seeking to elicit sympathy for crime victims."' In addi-
tion, prosecutors in Oklahoma have been admonished for inviting
juries to "be mean ' 7 and to send a "message ... to other would-
be criminals ....
III. LIVING WITH PAYNE
In the event that a defendant's attorney cannot convince the
trial court that victim impact evidence would render her client's
trial fundamentally unfair or otherwise contravene state constitu-
tional or statutory rules, she must incorporate the VIS into his
trial strategy. Even though this is a matter of extreme delicacy, a
defense attorney should consider establishing contact with the vic-
tim's family. Although the family's initial reaction may be to avoid
any contact with defense attorneys, counsel should not automati-
cally assume that all family members want the defendant exe-
cuted. The funeral director for the victim may be able to identify
a family spokesperson who may be approachable, or the director
may put the defense attorney in touch with a priest, minister, or
rabbi assisting the family during their tragedy. Many family mem-
bers may have strong religious beliefs which are more evolved
than "an eye for an eye,"" and thus, may be willing to speak to
the defendant's attorney. Indeed, a strong case can be made that
revictimization occurs when prosecutors seek to co-opt family
members as part of the prosecution team. Even so, if a defense
attorney locates a cooperative person willing to testify against a
death sentence, she may argue that their testimony is required
" See, e.g., McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that
prosecutor's function is to vindicate right of people and not to tack "as many skins of
victims as possible to the wall"); Stewart v. State, 757 P.2d 388, 396 (Okla. Grim. App.
1988) (stating that attorney engaged in improper argument to induce jury sympathy for
victim); Jones v. State, 738 P.2d 525, 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (stating that court has
repeatedly held it improper for prosecutors to invoke jury sympathy for crime victims);
Tobler v. State, 688 P.2d 350, 353-54 (Okla. Grim. App. 1984) (holding that pleas of jury
sympathy for victim was prejudicial); Sier v. State, 517 P.2d 803, 805 (Okla. Grim. App.
1973) (instructing jury not to let sympathy enter into their deliberations); Dupree v. State,
514 P.2d. 425, 427 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (same).
" Sier, 517 P.2d at 805.
76 Id.
"' Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2597 ("[A]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" (citing Exodus
21:22-23)).
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under Payne to rebut the VIS.
In the spring of 1992, Oklahoma executed Olan Randle Robi-
son, who sought to introduce evidence at sentencing that the vic-
tim's family members opposed the imposition of the death penalty
on him.7 8 The trial court denied his request and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision.7 9 In
seeking certiorari shortly before his execution, Robison argued
that under Payne, even-handed justice required that victim impact
evidence submitted by the defendant be considered.8" The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari, sending Robison to his
death without deciding whether victim impact evidence, clearly a
sword in the hands of a prosecutor, might also be used as a shield
in the hands of a defense attorney.81
Voir dire may present a defense attorney with an opportunity to
soften the effect of a VIS. A defense attorney may also lessen the
impact of a VIS by asking potential jurors if they think family
members could serve as jurors or if they feel that the jury's job in
rendering the verdict is to represent the deceased's family. The
jurors' responses may also show whether they view their function
as doling out vengeance to help in the healing process of the vic-
tim's family. Admonishing the jurors that their role is to do jus-
tice can be effectively reinforced during closing arguments by re-
minding them that others, such as God, are better suited to
dispense revenge.
Rebutting victim impact evidence requires a thorough investiga-
tion of the background and life of the victim. If faced with over-
whelming evidence that the deceased had a loving family, a de-
fense attorney should compare the victim's life to her client's life.
If the victim's background was filled with love and nurturing en-
couragement, defense counsel should contrast this with her cli-
78 Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
445 (1991). Robison shot and killed three people at a residence where he believed some
valuable gold jewelry belonging to his girlfriend was hidden. Id. at 1502-03. He was con-
victed of three counts of first degree murder. Id. at 1502. Robison's attorney wanted the
testimony of a victim's relative, who did not seek the death penalty, to be admitted as a
mitigating factor for the jury's consideration. Id. at 1504. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion of such evidence. Id. at
1505.
79 Id. at 1505 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987)).
So Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1216-17 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 445
(1991).
"' Robison, 112 S. Ct. at 445.
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ent's life as one of abject neglect. For example, it might be useful
to show that while the victim was entering college, facing a future
filled with promise, the defendant was entering a juvenile deten-
tion facility and escaping the physical and emotional abuse of his
parents. Where possible, a defense attorney should equate the
children of the victim with the children of the defendant.
In rare instances, defense counsel may be able to impugn the
character of the victim. To do so, she must locate victims of the
victim. Also, if confronted with an especially bloodthirsty family, a
defense attorney may seek to gainfully employ evidence which
shows bad character of family members. The mere threat of air-
ing the family's dirty laundry may cause the family to withdraw its
demand for death. It is often said that people carrying the great-
est guilt often scream the loudest for vengeance.
Once the personal characteristics of the victim are placed in is-
sue, defense counsel may argue that the defense is entitled to any
evidence in the prosecutor's files regarding the victim's bad char-
acter. Therefore, a Brady request82 should be filed, insisting that
the defense is entitled to such information because it may have an
effect on the sentence to be imposed.
A defense attorney should tactfully inform VIS witnesses that
the rights of cross-examination and rebuttal are not affected by
the Payne decision. In addition, defense counsel should gently, but
firmly, insist that it is her duty to try the allegations. During cross-
examination, family members should be asked about positive de-
velopments since the murder. Questions about how the family is
doing and if they are receiving any help coping with the tragedy
are appropriate. If someone claims that the murder caused her to
seek psychiatric assistance, defense counsel should subpoena the
doctor's records and consider calling the doctor as a witness. A
defense attorney may also explore the possibility of introducing
expert testimony on the issue of whether the execution of her cli-
ent will help the survivors. Above all, the cross-examination must
be soothing and nonconfrontational, while expressing the defend-
ant's remorse through the tone and substance of the questions.
In appropriate cases, defense counsel may consider calling the
spouse of the murder victim as a defense witness. This would keep
82 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring, as matter of due process,
that prosecutor disclose evidence favorable to accused).
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the spouse out of the courtroom during the trial, since most wit-
nesses are not permitted to observe a trial in which they are testi-
fying.8" Otherwise, a defense attorney may consider asking
whether the victim was a compassionate and forgiving person to
show that the victim would not have wanted a death sentence for
the defendant.
Finally, at the close of the sentencing phase, defense counsel
should seek an instruction that emotional and financial harm are
not aggravating circumstances. Unfortunately, if a defendant lives
in a state in which emotional and financial harm are considered
proper aggravating circumstances, as is now the case in
Oklahoma, defense counsel should object to the instruction as un-
constitutional and preserve the issue on appeal.
IV. INFLICTING PAYNE ON OKLAHOMA
Recently, Oklahoma State Senator Brooks Douglass of
Oklahoma City, himself a victim of a violent crime," introduced
Senate Bill 816, innocuously titled "An Act Relating to Victims'
Rights."85 Regrettably, Governor Walters approved the bill on
April 30, 1992.8" The new law, which became effective on July 1,
1992, allows Oklahoma sentencing, pardon, and parole decisions
to consider the victim's character and the impact of the crime on
the victim's family.8
7
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2615 (1992) (exclusion of witnesses).
8' See Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In
late 1979, when Douglass was sixteen years old, Glen Burton Ake and an accomplice mur-
dered Douglass's parents and attempted to rape his twelve-year-old sister. Id. at 4. Before
fleeing, Ake shot Douglass's sister twice, shot Douglass once, and left both for dead. Id.
Although Ake was sentenced to death, the United States Supreme Court reversed his sen-
tence because he was denied court-appointed psychiatric assistance at trial. Ake, 470 U.S. at
86-87.
85 S.B. 816, 43d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 442 (West).
See Act of Apr. 30, 1992, supra note 6; see also Paul English, Walters Signs Bill Giving
Victims Voice, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 1, 1992, at 19. The Daily Oklahoman reported that
Senate Bill 816 won final passage on April 27, 1992 by a vote of 47-0. Id. Governor Wal-
ters praised Senate Bill 816 as landmark legislation that will mean "a more equitable sys-
tem of justice." d.
"' See OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 215.39(B) (1992) (as amended) (any victim impact statement
presented to court at sentencing must accompany report to Department of Corrections and
Pardon and Parole Board); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a(C) (1992) (as amended) (victim im-
pact evidence submitted to court during sentencing of convicted criminal); OKLA. STAT. tit.
57, §§ 332.2 & 332.8 (1992) (as amended) (providing for victim impact testimony at parole
hearing and requiring consideration of victim impact statement when making parole
recommendations).
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Specific provisions deserve mention. First, the very definition of
VIS supplied in the bill appears to violate the United States Con-
stitution. According to Section 984 of Oklahoma's Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, as amended, a VIS includes "the victim's opinion
of a recommended sentence." 88 Recall that this type of evidence,
found unconstitutional in Booth, did not receive the Rehnquist
Court's seal of approval in Payne.89 Moreover, opinion evidence
regarding what sentence a defendant deserves has long been ex-
cluded in Oklahoma.90
Constitutional infirmities aside, the bill's most remarkable char-
acteristic may be its breadth. Under the new law, a court is re-
quired to consider a VIS when sentencing a person convicted of
any crime."1 Pardon and Parole Board members are also required
to consider any victim impact statements presented to the court at
the time of sentencing." In addition, by legislative fiat, the
Oklahoma law makes victims, and in the case of murder victims,
their immediate survivors, part of the prosecution team.3 Consul-
tation between the prosecutor and the victim, or the family of a
murder victim, is required before critical decisions are made."
Also, prosecutors are now required to inform victims of any delay
in the prosecution of a felony case involving a violent crime or sex
88 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 984 (1992) (as amended). "Victim" is defined as "a person who
suffers personal injury or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct." OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 142.3(14) (1992) (as amended). The definition of VIS, however, sweeps much more
broadly and includes information regarding the impact of the crime on "a victim or mem-
ber of the immediate family." OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 984. Members of the immediate family
include spouses, children by birth or adoption, stepchildren, parents, and siblings of the
victim. Id.
" Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 n.2 (1991). The Court's holding did not
discuss the constitutionality of admitting into evidence the victim's family's opinions of the
defendant and of the appropriate sentence. Id.
" See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1987) (such evidence
is irrelevant and interferes with jury's duty of exercising "conscience of the community"),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 445 (1991).
" OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a(C) (1992) (as amended). The specific provision states that
"[w]hen sentencing a person convicted of a crime, the court shall consider any victim im-
pact evidence." Id.
" OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 332.8 (1992) (as amended); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 332.2
(1992) (as amended) (allowing victim or victim's representative to testify at parole hearing
for at least five minutes).
"3 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 984.1(B) (1992). This new measure provides that "[ilf a
presentence investigation report is prepared, the person preparing the report shall consult
with the victim or member of the immediate family of the victim if the victim is deceased,
incapacitated or incompetent, and include any victim impact statement in the presentence
investigation report." Id.
94 Id.
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offense."
To make matters worse, on April 14, 1992, Governor Walters
signed into law Oklahoma House Bill 2271." This law effectively
expands the list of aggravating circumstances in capital murder
prosecutions to include consideration of the harm and loss suf-
fered by the family of the victim and the nature and extent of the
harm and loss suffered by the victim. 97 Consequently, defense
counsel in capital cases now have an affirmative duty to explore
the background and character of the murder victim. And, in or-
der to vender effective assistance of counsel, capital defense attor-
neys must investigate the veracity of victim impact evidence.
Tragically, the Oklahoma legislature has now legislatively de-
creed that, at least in capital murder cases, victims will receive un-
equal treatment depending upon their relative value to society
and the ability of surviving family members to articulate their
grief and loss. Capital murder defendants "fortunate" enough to
kill someone without any family will escape the draconian state
laws permitting victim impact evidence and may thereby escape
the death penalty. Similarly, "if a defendant murdered a conve-
nience store clerk in cold blood during the course of an armed
robbery, he should be permitted to rebut evidence supporting the
new aggravating circumstance by offering evidence unknown to
him at the time of the crime about the immoral character of his
victim.""8 Sadly, although all persons are created equal as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law, under Oklahoma law, murder
victims thoughout the state will no longer enjoy the equal protec-
tion of the law.
CONCLUSION
By permitting the injection of victim impact evidence into capi-
tal sentencing determinations, Payne v. Tennessee dramatically al-
ters the criteria for deciding which defendants deserve the death
penalty. According to Payne, jury sentencing must still reflect an
OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 215.33(D) (1992) (as amended).
See HousE BILL, supra note 7 (permitting introduction of victim impact evidence dur-
ing capital sentencing proceedings).
' OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10(C) (1992) (as amended). The amended portion states
that "the state may introduce evidence about the victim and about the impact of the mur-
der on the family of the victim" as an aggravating circumstance. Id.
" Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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individualized determination of whether a defendant should be
executed based upon his character and the circumstances of his
crime. However, a defendant's blameworthiness or moral culpabil-
ity may now be assessed by reference to the victim's character or
the peculiar circumstances or sufferings of the victim's family.
Thus, Payne permits the introduction of arbitrary and capricious
criteria into capital sentencing determinations. Worse still, the in-
flammatory nature of victim impact evidence is certain to fore-
shadow an increase in the number of death sentences by diverting
the jury's attention away from the defendant and focusing instead
on the character of the murder victim and the palpable suffering
of grief-stricken family members.
In a reactionary rush towards retribution, the Oklahoma state
legislature has passed victim impact evidence legislation which is
at best unwise and at worst unconstitutional. The new laws sub-
stantially increase the obligations of defense counsel representing
capital clients. In addition to investigating the circumstances of
the crime and the background and character of the defendant,
defense counsel must expend precious time and effort exploring
the character of the victim. Moreover, Oklahoma's victim impact
legislation may tempt unscrupulous prosecutors to prey upon re-
luctant family members by recruiting them to testify in favor of a
death sentence. Homicide survivors are extremely vulfierable and
susceptible to being manipulated by prosecutors who seek to gain
a tactical advantage by exploiting their grief and anger. Special
care must be taken to prevent the "revictimization" of surviving
family members. The inevitable consequences of inflicting Payne
on Oklahoma's Code of Criminal Procedure is to skew the state's
criminal justice system in favorem mortis.
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